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5Abstract
General empirical evidence suggests that contracting out refuse collection results in a cost
decrease in the order of 20%. However, although the method of contracting out refuse
collection has become more popular, it is still less common than in-house provision. This
paper investigates the reasons behind this phenomenon.
Recently, López-de-Silanes et al. (1997) tried to explain the reservedness of local authorities
towards contracting out with US-data and show that political patronage is an important
explanation. In this article we give such an empirical assessment using Dutch data.
We base our empirical research on the combination of the theories around efficiency,
interest group influence and ideology. To test these theories we model the choice between
private and public provision of refuse collection on the one hand side and the choice
between in-house and out-house provision on the other side. Data are available for nearly
all Dutch municipalities.
A most striking conclusion is that nearly all political parties in the Netherlands do have a
preference for public and in-house provision of refuse collection. We find only modest
evidence for the hypothesis that a high level of real estate tax (proxy for the soundness of
municipal financial affairs, the efficiency argument) or a low level of unemployment (the
interest group argument) raises the probability of  private and out-house provision. We find
more evidence for the assumed relation between the size of municipalities and private
collection. In all cases a smaller municipality has a higher chance of private collection.
Therefore, scale effects are important for the choice between public and private provision.
For the choice between out-house and in-house collection in relation to scale less evidence
exists.
Compared with other studies we estimated more general models, allowing for higher order
effects and heteroskedasticity. We show that the standard Logit model is too restrictive,
both for the choice between private and public provision and the choice between in-house
and out-house provision. Signs and significance do differ between the different models.
Especially, for the choice between in-house and out-house provision the applied model
matters. In this case, only unemployment and municipality size has influence. Thus, more
attention is needed for the implications of model choice for the explanation of the raised
questions.
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71. Introduction
There seems evidence that contracting out government services saves taxpayers money, and
sometimes a lot of money, relative to public provision. In a recent overview, Domberger
and Jensen (1997) show that contracting out a broad field of government services suggests
cost savings in the order of twenty percent without sacrificing the quality of services
provided.
Also Tang (1997), in a critical assessment of the existing literature, comes to the conclusion
that the private sector is found to be more efficient in refuse collection, fire protection,
cleaning services, and capital intensive waste-water treatment, while in sectors as water
supply and railways the results are more mixed.
Especially, the cost savings of private refuse collection have been discussed at length in the
literature. Based on UK-data Domberger et al. (1986) published a study on the effects of
contracting out household refuse collection in the United Kingdom. They concluded that
there are cost saving of 22% for contracting out to private companies. Szymanski and
Wilkins (1993) and Szymanski (1996) have confirmed these results, based on an extension
(in years) of this database. Kitchen (1976) estimates a cost decrease of Canadian $ 2.23 per
capita when private firms collect household waste with data for 48 Canadian municipalities.
Stevens (1978) arrives at a cost decrease between 7% and 30% due to contracting out for
the USA, where the magnitude of the effect depends on the size of the municipality.
Recently, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (1997) show similar cost savings between 15% and 20% for
the Netherlands, in case Dutch municipalities are contracting out refuse collection.
Moreover, Ohlsson (1998) reports almost the same estimations for Sweden.
Although the method of contracting out refuse collection has become more popular, it is
still less common than in-house provision. In the United Kingdom only 30% of the
contracts for refuse collection is placed out-house (see Szymanski (1996)). In the
Netherlands 40% of the municipalities use private collectors for refuse. However, due to
the fact that private collectors are especially active in small villages only 20% of total
tonnages are in private hands (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (1997)). Only Ohlsson (1998) finds
for Sweden that private provision is slightly more common than public provision.
Furthermore, a recent study by López-de-Silanes et al. (1997) shows the reservedness of
local authorities towards contracting out. Based on data in 1987 and 1992 for 3042 counties
for twelve services as water supply, landfills, libraries etc. only 25% of the services in 1987
8and 35% in 1992 has placed out-house. Moreover, in this article a nice empirical
investigation of the mode of providing government services is given, where three leading
theories (namely, efficiency, political patronage, and ideology) are investigated. The
evidence presented in this article indicates that state clean government laws and state laws
restricting county spending encourage privatization, whereas strong public unions
discourage it. This points to the important roles played by political patronage and taxpayer
resistance to government spending in the privatization decision.
In this article, we examine for the Netherlands the determinants of the provision mode of
refuse collection. Data are available for 554 (i.e., almost all) Dutch municipalities. We find
evidence for efficiency and ideological elements as a ground for contracting out, and to a
lesser extent on political patronage. Moreover, we extend the existing literature by
investigating more general specifications. Especially, the often applied linear Logit model
seems rather restrictive. Here, with the support of nonparametric techniques, we construct
extended parametric models, which give a better fit for this type of studies. Thereby, a
better explanation of the determinants of contracting out can be given.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relevant
theoretical issues. In Section 3 we describe the data we use. Section 4 contains the
estimation results based on linear Logit. In Section 5 we investigate the robustness of these
results, using nonparametric techniques, resulting in extended parametric specifications.
Section 6 contains a study of the effects of changes in the votes for the political parties.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical issues
Before we specify the data and the empirical results it is worthwhile to discuss theoretical
issues concerning the contracting out decision (see López-de-Silanes et al. (1997), Tang
(1997)). An interesting point has been raised by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). They
argue that private contractors might fail to pursue goals that politicians want to attain.
Especially, in circumstances such as health care and prisons where politicians cannot write a
complete contract that specifies exactly what contractors are supposed to do in all
circumstances, it may not be straightforward to contract out.
The logic suggests some potential efficiency benefits of in-house government services to
ensure quality. However, it is not clear how important such benefits are for refuse
collection. Hart et al. (1997, p. 1154) argue that in the case of refuse collection the damage
9to quality can be offset by a good contract, so that “private provision is superior.”
Nevertheless, according to a Dutch inquiry, such elements are still available and some
municipalities put forward that quality is the reason for in-house provision (NG (1998)). A
prediction following from this kind of reasoning is that the wealth of local government
decreases the likelihood of contracting out. A poorer government is less likely to care about
quality and is more interested in cost savings. Furthermore, there are some indications that,
especially for small municipalities, the production function represents economies of scale
(see, for example, Kitchen (1977) and Stevens (1978)). Kitchen finds that the maximum
scale in refuse collection occurs in cities of about 324,000 inhabitants. Stevens (1978) finds
increasing returns to scale, if the city population is less than fifty thousand and constant
returns to scale if the city population is larger than fifty thousand. Therefore, to check for
the efficiency arguments the number of inhabitants should be included in the empirical
setting.
An alternative view of the contracting out decision focuses on public choice theory (see
Buchanan (1987)). This approach explains social behavior as the product of free choices of
individuals. Because self-interested politicians, bureaucrats and unions have a stake in in-
house provision since in doing so, they can maximize their status. López-de-Silanes et al.
(1997) argue that in the United States the main political factor favoring in-house provision
seems to be the public employee unions. Moreover, the role of unions becomes more
important and, therefore, in-house provision becomes more beneficiary if unemployment
in a municipality is high. This interest group theory has clear empirical implications.
The third theory stresses the importance of voter ideology. To evaluate this view, one
should control for voting patterns in different municipalities. Hereby, it is assumed that the
contracting out decision is simultaneously determined by the degree of voters’ anti-
government sentiment. This laissez-faire sentiment is most available by right-wing parties.
Therefore, also this voter ideology has clear empirical implications.
3. Data
The analysis of this article is based on a 1998 census of the Dutch Association for Refuse
and Cleansing Management (NVRD). In general, three modes of provision are used in this
dataset. The first mode is private provision (42%). The public provision is divided into two
modes. The second mode is collecting waste through its own service organizations (28%).
The third mode is collecting waste through the organization of an other municipality or
external public organizations (30%). Moreover, municipalities’ characteristics are available
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from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and consists the fraction of voters in a municipality for
several parties. For 554 of the Dutch municipalities (98.5% of all municipalities) figures are
available.1
Table 1. Descriptive statistics database
Variables Average Maximum Minimum Standard dev.
No private provision (%) 58 100 0 49
In-house provision (%) 28 100 0 45
Employment (per 100 inhabitants) 41 93 17 11
Real estate tax (ECU per inhabitant) 97 315 39 29
Inhabitants (* 1000) 27 722 1 51
Mayor Conservative Liberals (%) 19 100 0 39
Mayor Social Democrats (%) 28 100 0 45
Mayor Progressive Liberals (%) 4 100 0 20
Conservative Liberals (%) 16 52 0 9
Christian Democrats (%) 25 68 0 10
Orthodox Protestants (%) 4 52 0 8
Social Democrats (%) 16 49 0 10
Progressive Liberals (%) 8 34 0 7
Green Left (%) 4 34 0 6
Efficiency variables
In the López-de-Silanes et al.-study clean government variables and budget constraints are
included to test for the trade-off between efficiency and social arguments. However,
contrary to this study clean government data are only available at a national level and,
therefore, cannot be included in our dataset. Moreover, the freedom of Dutch
municipalities to collect their own taxes is very restricted. In general, the single source of
tax revenue for local government is a real estate tax, with as tax-base the value of dwellings.
There is a great variation in the level of this real estate tax. The average municipality raises a
tax of 97 euro per inhabitant per year while the cheapest municipality has a tax of 39 euro
and the most expensive municipality a tax of 316 euro. A poor local government has to
raise a high level of this real estate tax and it could be expected that such a local
government is more willing to contract out refuse collection. Therefore, the total level of
local real estate tax is included in the estimation.
Interest group variables
Also finding data for the interest group variables seems hard. No data are available for the
number of public employee unions in a municipality. Similar to López-de-Silanes, it is
                                                          
1 For 8 municipalities data are lacking for the real estate tax, for 3 municipalities data are
lacking for the unemployment rate and for 1 municipality data are lacking for the parties.
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possible to include labor-market conditions as an approximation of interest-group variables.
In general, we should expect that in-house provision becomes more beneficiary if
unemployment in a municipality is high. Therefore, the unemployment level is included in
our estimations.
Political variables
We include the fractions of the following parties, based on the local elections of May 19942:
green left, social democrats, progressive liberals, christian democrats, and orthodox
Protestants.3,4 In addition, we looked at municipality-level voting in the 1994-election for
Parliament as alternative measures of the electorate’s ideological orientation. Nevertheless,
the local elections seem to be the best measure of predicting the probability of private
contracting.
The electoral system is based on proportional representation. In most of the municipalities,
no single party holds a majority in the municipality-council. Therefore, the municipality-
government, which actually rules the municipality, consists, in general, of a coalition of
parties. An important player in the municipality-council is the mayor, who is not elected but
is approved by the central government. Therefore, the political color of the mayor is
included in our dataset.5
4. Estimation results: linear Logit
We start our estimations with a standard logit analysis for two models.6 In the first model,
the choice between public and private provisions is estimated as dependent on a number of
explaining variables. In the second model the choice between in-house and out-house
provision is the dependent variable. In both models, all explaining variables are initially the
same. Thus, the basic model is:
                                                          
2 There were new elections in May 1998.
3 The so-called local parties are excluded.
4 Green left: Groen Links + SP, social democrats: PvdA, progressive liberals: D66, Christian
democrats: CDA, orthodox protestant: SGP + RPF + GPV. Combination of the parties is
tested using a Log Likelihood test.
5 The so-called Green Left have only one mayor and orthodox protestant have 8 mayors and will
not be included in the estimation. Therefore, in the estimations only three dummy’s are
included for social democrats, progressive liberals and conservative liberals, while Christian
democrats has been used as a reference.
6 The probit and the OLS results are extremely similar.
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where:
Dep: Dependent variable, 
model 1: dummy with value 1 for municipalities with no private collection;
model 2: dummy with value 1 for municipalities with collection in-house;
and where x contains the following explanatory variables (next to a constant term):
E: Employment (inhabitants per person with an unemployment benefit);
T: Real estate tax (guilders per inhabitant);
I: Number of inhabitants;
M: Mayor (dummy with value 1 if a municipality has a mayor of CL, SD or PL);
CL: Conservative Liberals (percentage of total votes in a municipality);
CD: Christian Democrats (percentage of total votes in a municipality);
OP: Orthodox Protestants (percentage of total votes in a municipality);
SD: Social Democrats (percentage of total votes in a municipality);
PL: Progressive Liberals (percentage of total votes in a municipality);
GL: Green Left (percentage of total votes in a municipality).
The parameter vector b  contains the unknown parameters, and L represents the Logit-
transformation.
Results are given in Table 2. This Table contains the effects of changes in the explanatory
variables on the probability of No-private collection and In-house collection, respectively.
We distinguish two types of effects: a micro-effect and a macro-effect. In the former case
we calculate the effects of changes in the explanatory variables by considering a single
municipality, namely, the "average municipality". Thus, we calculate the effects on the
probability when the explanatory variables are evaluated in their average values. The macro-
effects are calculated by averaging the effects of changes in the explanatory variables over
all municipalities. The micro- and macro-effects yield more or less the same results, the
difference mainly being that the macro-effects are generally slightly smaller in absolute
value.
First, we discuss the choice between public and private provision (the first and second
column of table 2). It is interesting to notice that none of the parties (even not the
conservative liberals) has a positive sign for private provision. However, for conservative
liberals the mayor has a positive and significant sign towards private provision and,
therefore, the overall effect can be positive. For conservative liberals, social democrats,
progressive liberals and orthodox Protestants the estimated (negative) probabilities are
significant. Therefore, most of the Dutch parties sec do not seem in favor of private
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provision. Especially, Orthodox Protestants are strongly in favor of public provision. This
can probably be explained by the strong and ultimate role the government plays in these
parties.
Table 2. Regression results basic model (Logit)
No-private collection Collection in-house
Micro Macro Micro Macro
Employment 0.27 0.21 -0.87* -0.46
Real estate tax 0.08* 0.06* 0.11* 0.08*
Inhabitants 0.75* 0.54* 0.21* 0.15
Mayor Conservative Liberals -10.15* -7.59* -3.09 -0.78
Mayor Social Democrats 5.12 3.19 -4.27 -2.14
Mayor Progressive Liberals 27.81* 17.18* 11.97 9.83
Conservative Liberals 0.62* 0.45* 0.43 0.49
Christian Democrats 0.39 0.27* 0.21 0.18
Orthodox Protestants 1.13* 0.81* 0.84* 0.62*
Social Democrats 0.61* 0.60 -0.23 -0.20
Progressive Liberals 0.87* 0.60* 1.02* 0.83*
Green Left 0.47 0.24 0.58 0.39
* Significant at 90%.
Table 2 does confirm our preliminary results on inhabitants. As we should expect if the
number of habitants decreases the probability of private provision increases. Scale effects
make public provision less likely. However, the data give less evidence for the prior that a
high level of real estate tax and a low level of unemployment in a municipality raise the
probability of private provision.
For in-house provision the over-all results are more suggestive. Municipalities with a high
level of unemployment have a higher probability of in-house provision. By in-house
provision a municipality has more direct control to use the own collection unit as an
employment instrument compared with a non-private collection unit. This evidence is
consistent with the theory that interest group considerations are an important obstacle to
out-house provision. In addition, the probability estimation for the number of inhabitants
seems right. As we should have expected, if the number of habitants increases then the
probability of in-house provision increases. In addition, the data give evidence for the prior
that a high level of real estate tax raises the probability of in-house provision. In addition,
the results for political variables are suggestive. Except the social democrats, all political
parties have a positive attitude towards in-house provision. However, the estimated
probability for social democrats is very small and non-significant. In addition, here we can
conclude that the Dutch parties sec seems in favor of in-house provision.
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5. Robustness of  results
The basic Logit model presented in the previous section includes all explanatory variables
in a simple linear way. However, this linear relationship may be too restrictive, possibly
yielding biased results. To investigate this possibility, we considered nonparametric
regressions of the dependent variable on each of the explanatory variables, together with
uniform 95%-confidence bounds (see, for instance, Haerdle and Linton (1994) for the
theory, and Euwals et al. (1998) for a comparable application). Figures 1 and 2 contain
several of these nonparametric regressions.as illustration. For instance, figure 1a clearly
suggests that the relationship between no-private collection and employment according to
standard Logit may be too restrictive: the nonparametric regression seems to be too
nonlinear to be fitted well by a standard linear Logit specification. Similar remarks apply to
the other included figures.
To make our models more flexible, so that possible biased results will be avoided, we first
experimented by including cross terms and quadratic terms. Based on Log-likelihood-ratio-
tests we include quadratic terms for employment, social democrats and green left for the
model with no private collection as dependent variable. The second model, with collection
in-house as dependent, is extended with a quadratic term for employment, conservative
liberals and progressive liberals. Table 3 presents the results with the quadratic terms.7
Table 3. Regression results Logit model with quadratic terms
No-private collection Collection in-house
Employment1,2 -0.07* -0.87*
Real estate tax 0.05 0.08*
Inhabitants 0.48* 0.14
Mayor Conservative Liberals -10.48* -1.24
Mayor Social Democrats 4.10 -2.31
Mayor Progressive Liberals 20.56* 15.39*
Conservative Liberals2 0.51* 0.61*
Christian Democrats 0.26 0.16
Orthodox Protestants 0.90* 0.78*
Social Democrats1 0.61* -0.28
Progressive Liberals2 0.65* 0.96*
Green Left1 1.20 0.34
* Significant at 90%
1. Quadratic term of this variable is included for the no-private collection model
2. Quadratic term of this variable is included for the collection in-house model
                                                          
7 For all estimations the micro and macro effects are extremely similar. Therefore, from table
3 on we only present the more interesting macro effects.
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A comparison of these extended Logit-results with the standard Logit-results of Table 2
reveals that the effects of most explanatory variables are quite comparable, although there
are a few striking differences. In case of no-private collection the effect of employment
becomes negative, and significantly so, in line with the interest-group-theory. In addition,
the effects of real estate tax and Christian democrats are no longer significant, whereas the
effect of social democrats becomes significant. In case of in-house provision we see that
the macro-effect of employment now turns out to be significantly negative, again
supporting the interest-group-theory. In addition, the variables mayor progressive liberals
and conservative liberals become significant. The effect of social democrats remains, as
only party, negative, but again small and insignificantly.
Including cross terms and/or quadratic terms is one way to extend the standard linear
Logit specification. A simple further extension consists of allowing for heteroskedasticity.
We considered heteroskedasticity of exponential form, following and included various
variables (see Melenberg and Van Soest (1996) for details). On the basis of Log-likelihood-
ratio-tests we found that in case of no-private collection the variable inhabitants should be
included, and in case of collection in-house the variable progressive liberals. Table 4
contains the macro-effects of these extended models.
Table 4. Regression results Logit model (quadratic terms and heteroskedasticity)
No-private collection Collection in-house
Employment1,2 -0.11 -0.57*
Real estate tax 0.02 0.06
Inhabitants3 0.40* 1.23*
Mayor Conservative Liberals -7.77* 0.28
Mayor Social Democrats 2.61 -2.53
Mayor Progressive Liberals 18.83* 9.51
Conservative Liberals2 0.63* 0.42
Christian Democrats 0.15 0.36
Orthodox Protestants 0.13* 0.37
Social Democrats1 0.71* 0.09
Progressive Liberals2,4 0.45* 0.45
Green Left1 1.29* 0.18
* Significant at 90%.
1 Quadratic term of this variable is included for the no-private collection model
2 Quadratic term of this variable is included for the collection in-house model
3 Variable is allowed for heteroskedasticity for the no-private collection model
4 Variable is allowed for heteroskedasticity for the collection in-house model
A comparison between these results and those of the previous Logit specifications again
reveals similarities, but also some further differences. In case of no-private collection the
variable employment is negative, thus in accordance with the interest-group theory as we
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discussed before. Furthermore, the political effects become somewhat different in
magnitude. Particularly, the effect of green left is higher and significant, whereas the effect
of orthodox Protestants seriously declines. In case of in-house collection, the only
significant effects are now employment and inhabitants, both strongly supporting the prior
views. Moreover, we see a change in the sign of the variables mayor conservative liberals
and social democrats, but these effects remain insignificant.
Of course, even this more complicated model may be too restrictive, yielding possibly
biased results. One way to proceed is to consider an even more advanced model, or to turn
to semi- or nonparametrics. Before proceeding in such a direction, however, it makes sense
to test the current model specification. We do this by using a nonparametric test, following
Horowitz (1992), but modifying his Probit application to our Logit-specification. Figures 3a
and 3b show the results. This nonparametric test does not reject the model specification
under consideration at 95%, if the Logit-curve lies between the 95%-uniform confidence
bounds. We see that the Logit curves are mostly between the confidence bounds,
suggesting that our specification makes sense, and may require only minor additional
modification, which we leave to further research.
Although the standard Logit model and the Logit model with only quadratic terms are
rejected on the basis of Log-likelihood-ratio tests, it may make sense to quantify somehow
the gain in applying the final model. We use two measures of goodness-of-fit, suggested by,
for instance, Amemiya (1985). The first measure is the Log-likelihood Ratio Index (LRI),
which is defined as:
where L(model) is the log-likelihood-value of the model under consideration, and L(0) is
the log-likelihood of the model with only a constant term, i.e., without explanatory values.
The LRI-values are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 Likelihood Ratio Indexes (LRI) of the various models
No-private collection In-house collection
Standard Logit 0.15 0.16
Logit with squared terms 0.17 0.18
Logit with squared terms and heteroskedasticity 0.18 0.25
According to these results we see that in case of no-private collection the improvement is
not spectacular, and can already essentially be assigned to going from standard Logit to
(0)L
L(model)
-1 
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Logit with quadratic terms. In case of in-house collection the improvement seems to be
more substantial, and basically due to allowing for heteroskedasticity.
The second measure is simply the percentage of correct predictions, where the prediction
equals 1 if the model predicts a probability equal to or larger than a half, and where the
prediction is 0 otherwise. Table 6 contains the results.
Table 6 Percentage correct predictions of the various models
No-private collection In-house collection
Model 0 (only a constant) 58 72
Standard Logit 68 75
Logit with squared terms 70 75
Logit with squared terms and heteroskedasticity 69 77
Model 0 in Table 6 refers to the Logit specification without explanatory variables, i.e., with
only a constant term included. Here we see that in case of no-private collection the
improvement by extending the standard Logit specification is modest. Most gain in getting
better predictions is obtained by including explanatory variables, i.e., going from Model 0 to
standard Logit. In case of in-house collection we see that the improvement by allowing for
heteroskedasticity is comparable by the improvement obtained by going from Model 0 to
standard Logit, or Logit with only quadratic terms.
6. Some further evidence on the influence of  politics
In the former sections the effects of changes in the influence of political parties is
measured in a partial way. In reality, when a specific party gets a lower part of the total
votes, other parties will get more. To investigate the effects of the political parties
somewhat further, we also calculated the macro effects if one party gets 1% more votes and
some other party then gets 1% less. Tables 7a and 7b contain the results.8
                                                          
8 Notice that the tables are reasonably (anti-) symmetric, i.e., if entry (i,j) is positive, then
entry (j,i) is negative and, in absolute value, more or less of the same magnitude. The
matrices are not perfectly anti-symmetric, since we are calculating the effects using
nonlinear models. Significancy is also symmetric, with one exception: in case of No-private-
collection (extended Logit) the CD(+1%)/SD(-1%) effect is -0.58 and significant, whereas
the converse effect is +0.57, but insignificant.
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Table 7a Change in probability no-private collection
Standard Logit
Decrease by 1%
SD CL CD PL GL OP
SD -0.47 0.12 -0.15 0.11 -0.38
CL 0.01 0.16 -0.15 0.15 -0.34
CD -0.21 -0.15 -0.34 0.00 -0.55*
PL 0.11 0.12 0.34 0.18 -0.35
GL -0.23 -0.06 -0.10 -0.29 -0.52In
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
1%
OP 0.41 0.32 0.57* 0.22 0.43
Extended Logit (quadratic terms and heteroskedasticity)
Decrease by 1%
SD CL CD PL GL OP
SD 0.03 0.57 0.25 -0.72 -0.39
CL -0.09 0.48 0.17 -0.73 -0.42
CD -0.58* -0.53 -0.19 -1.23* -0.97*
PL -0.37 -0.40 0.25 -1.07 -0.65*
GL 0.52 0.55 1.13* 0.72 0.08In
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
1%
OP 0.33 0.46 0.91* 0.69* -0.18
* Significant at 90%.
In the no-private collection case with ordinary Logit, only the exchange of Christian
democrats for orthodox protestant votes has a significant effect: the Christian democrats
seem to be more private-minded. In the extended Logit specification this effect remains
present, and becomes even more significant. In this extended specification, more significant
effects appear. An increase for Christian democrats and decrease for social democrats
results in a lower probability for private collection. However, the opposite exchange is not
significant. The exchange between Christian democrats and green left has a relative large
and significant effect. In this case the direction of the exchange does not matter, if green
left gets more (less) votes the probability of private collection decreases (increases). Finally,
an exchange between progressive liberals and orthodox Protestants results in a changed
probability for private collection. Interestingly, because it is widely believed that this party
likes private provision more than the other parties. Exchanging conservative liberal-votes
for other parties does not have any significant effects.
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In case of in-house provision, ordinary Logit yields two significant effects, namely green
left versus social democrats and orthodox Protestants versus social democrats. In both
cases, the orthodox Protestants prefer non-private provision. The significance and
magnitude of these effects disappear in the extended Logit specification.
Table 7b Change in probability in-house provision
Standard Logit
Decrease by 1%
SD CL CD PL GL OP
SD -1.05 -0.29 -0.88 -0.60* -0.79*
CL 0.52 0.29 -0.34 -0.05 -0.24
CD 0.35 -0.20 -0.56 -0.36 -0.43
PL 0.98 0.43 0.59 0.45 -0.01
GL 0.55* 0.20 0.31 -0.42 -0.21In
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
1%
OP 0.94* 0.13 0.40 -0.05 0.24
Extended Logit (quadratic terms and heteroskedasticity)
Decrease by 1%
SD CL CD PL GL OP
SD -0.33 -0.30 -0.42 -0.05 -0.59
CL 0.47 0.13 -0.06 0.29 0.08
CD 0.30 -0.10 -0.10 0.19 -0.08
PL 0.33 0.04 0.12 0.38 0.05
GL 0.11 -0.29 -0.17 -0.28 -0.21In
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
1%
OP 0.01 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 0.17
* Significant at 90%.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we try to explain the reasons for the fact that contracting out refuse collection
is less common than in-house provision, although considerable efficiency improvements by
contracting out seem achievable. We present an empirical investigation motivated by
efficiency arguments, interest group theory, and ideology arguments.
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The most striking conclusion is that nearly all political parties in the Netherlands do have a
preference for public and in-house provision of refuse collection. Only very specific
exchanges between parties or the presence of a conservative liberal mayor can result in a
higher probability of private collection.
Only modest evidence is found for the hypothesis that a high level of real estate tax (proxy
for the soundness of municipal financial affairs) or a low level of unemployment raises the
probability of  private and out-house provision.
More evidence is found for the assumed relation between the size of municipalities and
private collection. In all cases a smaller municipality has a higher chance of private
collection. Therefore, scale effects are important for the choice between public and private
provision. For the choice between out-house and in-house collection little evidence exists
for the relation with size.
Compared with other studies we estimated more general models. In general there seems to
be no reason why only a linear relation between in-house provision and political variables
should be investigated. Therefore, other relations allowing for quadratic terms and
heteroskedasticity are investigated as well. Our results show that the standard Logit model
may be too restrictive, both for the choice between private and public provision and the
choice between in-house and out-house provision. Especially, for the choice between in-
house and out-house provision the applied model matters. In the most extended model we
do not find significant effects of political parties on this choice. In this case, only
unemployment and municipality size seem to have a significant influence. Thus, allowing
for a more general specification might yield better results and, as a consequence, a better
understanding of the contracting out decision.
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Figures
Figure 1a. Nonparametric regression of Employment on no-private collection
Figure 1b. Nonparametric regression of SD on no-private collection
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Figure 1c Nonparametric regression of GL on no-private collection
Figure 2a Nonparametric regression of Employment on in-house collection
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Figure 2b Nonparametric regression of CL on in-house collection
Figure 2c Nonparametric regression of PL on in-house collection
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Figure 3a. Nonparametric test of Logit estimation (basic model)
Figure 3b. Nonparametric test of Logit estimation (most extended model)
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